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WHAT WAS DISCOVERED IN THE 
QUEST FOR TRUTH? 
STEVEN H. GOLDBERG* 
Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. carries more responsibility and de- 
serves more credit than any other person or group for the enhanced dis- 
covery available to criminal defendants in 1989. His 1963 Tyrrell 
Williams Lecture, The Criminal Prosecution: Sporting Event or Quest for 
Truth?,' established the argument that pushed discovery into the crimi- 
nal justice system. Borrowing from Glanville Williams' description of 
the criminal trial as "in the nature of a game or sporting contest" and not 
"a serious inquiry aiming to distinguish between guilt and inn~cence,"~ 
he attacked arguments opposing discovery by implying that they fur- 
thered the "sporting event," while discovery furthered the "quest for 
truth." 
Justice Brennan entitles his twenty-six year reprise at the Tyrrell Wil- 
liams forum: The Criminal Prosecution: Sporting Event or Quest for 
Truth? A Progress R e p ~ r t . ~  He characterizes the results of his 1963 sug- 
gestions and predictions about criminal discovery as "mixed," emphasiz- 
ing that "[llaw's evolution is never done, and for every improvement 
made there is another reform that is ~verdue."~ 
Criminal discovery has outstripped Justice Brennan's claim of 
"mixed" results. His description of the twenty-five year transformation 
as merely "rapid"5 is too modest. From the picture in 1963, which he 
accurately describes as "quite a bleak one,"6 discovery is, today, de 
rigueur in criminal cases.' There is little to suggest a general reduction of 
* Dean and Professor of Law, Pace University 3chool of Law. The author, though a member 
of the American Bar Association's Committee on Criminal Justice Standards, expresses his own 
views. They almost never reflect the views of all members of the committee and only rarely reflect 
the views of a committee majority. 
1. 1963 WASH. U.L.Q. 279. 
2. Id. 
3. 68 WASH. U.L.Q. 1 (1990). 
4. Id. 
5. Id. at 4. 
6. Id. 
7. Counsel's absolute inattention to discovery is one of the few failings that might support an 
ineffective assistance claim. Though the standard for effective assistance seems so low as to be non- 
existent, there is some suggestion that the failure to do any discovery at  all might support an ineffec- 
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criminal case discovery in the f ~ t u r e . ~  
I agree, however, with Justice Brennan's assessment that the results of 
the "quest for truth" have been mixed. There has been an unintended 
and unexpected negative result from a quarter-century of questing for 
criminal justice truth. We have discovered the wrong truth-a discovery 
that both reflects and forecasts a serious misunderstanding about our 
criminal justice system. Criminal justice system truth is not "truth" in 
the "what really happened" sense. It is, rather, a "truth" that recognizes 
the likelihood of error and dictates its direction. If the "truth" arising 
from the imperfect world of criminal trial re-creation is wrong, it is to be 
wrong in favor of the criminal defendant-wrong in favor of liberty. Jus- 
tice Brennan finds this definition of criminal justice "truth" in the sys- 
tem's allocation and sizing of the burden of proof: 
There is always in litigation a margin of error, representing error in 
factfinding, which both parties must take into account. Where one party 
has at stake an interest of transcending value-as a criminal defendant his 
liberty-this margin of error is reduced as to him by the process of placing 
on the other party the burden . . . of persuading the factfinder at the conclu- 
sion of the trial of his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.g 
Criminal justice truth, as defined by the burden of proof, was part and 
parcel of due process for Justice Harlan. It is "bottomed," he said, "on a 
fundamental value determination of our society that it is far worse to 
convict an innocent. man than to let a guilty man go free."1° 
Justice Brennan's understanding of criminal justice "truth" and Jus- 
tice Harlan's understanding of the role of that "truth" in defining consti- 
tutionally required due process could not, today, command a majority in 
the Supreme Court of the United States. The current majority believes 
that due process and criminal justice "truth" are properly served when 
the guilty are convicted. Its criminal justice "truth" is the truth of "what 
really happened." It decides cases and discusses doctrine as if it believes 
that the criminal trial process actually isolates and identifies a "truth" 
tive assistance claim. While the Supreme Court did not find a failure of effective assistance in 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), it did, per Justice O'Connor, say: "In other words, 
counsel has a duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes 
particular investigations unnecessary." Id. at 691. 
8. Justice Brennan cites the ABA Standards for Criminal Justice calling for "full and free 
discovery" as the ideal to which Federal Rule 16 and the various state rules should aspire. 68 
WASH. U.L.Q. at 4. Although the Standards bind no one, they generally reflect the attitude of the 
bench and bar, if not at the time of promulgation, soon thereafter. 
9. Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525-26 (1958). 
10. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 372 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
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that a lawyer can know, a jury can discover, and an appellate court can 
assume. 
Harris v. New York " and Nix v. Whiteside l2 bring into sharp relief the 
current majority's more consequential view of knowable truth, as con- 
trasted with the traditional, system-defined view that criminal justice 
truth is certainty in the defendant's favor. Though he is no longer on the 
Court, former Chief Justice Burger captures in both opinions the tone of 
the current majority's belief that the system produces palpable truth. In 
Harris, the question was whether an unconstitutionally obtained confes- 
sion could be used for impeachment. The Court stated, without pause, 
that a criminal defendant's right to testify does not "include the right to 
commit perjury."13 In Whiteside, the question was whether a lawyer's 
threat to impeach a client's proposed testimony amounted to ineffective 
assistance. The Court decided that the lawyer's threat, based on the law- 
yer's belief that the proposed testimony was untrue, did not prejudice the 
defendant, even though it changed his testimony.14 
As it turns out, the confession with which Harris was impeached was a 
false statement concocted by the police officer for the sole purpose of 
discrediting Harris' denial. As luck would have it, Whiteside's actual 
testimony was the second and incomplete version of events, related to his 
lawyer under circumstances in which Whiteside was distrustful of the 
lawyer. The truthful proposed testimony, which he only related to his 
lawyer just before he was to testify, was never given. Does it matter that 
both of the above recitations are t r u e - o r  false?'' 
The Court's Harris pronouncement that there is no right to testify 
falsely is, of course, legal nonsense. All witnesses who have the right to 
testify have the right to lie. That is why we cross-examine them and 
why, when we catch them, we try to convict them of perjury. That is 
why neither lawyer nor court has the power to place a credibility filter 
between the witness and the factfinder.16 But that is not the issue here. 
Instead, the issue is the Court's belief that it had sufficient clairvoyance 
to know that Harris was going to lie and that Whiteside's lawyer was 
11. 401 U.S. 222 (1971). 
12. 475 U.S. 157 (1986). 
13. 401 U.S. at 225. 
14. 475 U.S. at 171. 
15. The author has made up the "facts" in this paragraph. The court did not have any better 
basis for its conclusions than the author. Both had only a trial transcript. , 
16. Goldberg, Heaven Help the Lawyer for a Civil Liar, 2 GEO. J .  LEGAL ETHICS 885 & nn.97- 
107 (1989). 
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sufficiently prescient to be able to discern the real truth. The Court de- 
cided both cases as if it knew that the representations in the immediately 
preceding paragraph were not true. Its assumption that the system pro- 
duces "real truth"--discoverable by the'lawyer and by the appellate 
court-is essential to the Court's pronouncements and decisions. 
It is a very short distance from speaking as if the system can find "real 
truth" to concluding that "real truth" is the raison d'etre for the criminal 
justice system. The current Court's "truth," as an achievable end of the 
system, has supplanted the Brennan-Harlan "truth," as a justified end of 
the system. 
Consider the Court's harmless error decisions, counsel decisions, and 
decisions interpreting due process. During the last two decades, the 
Court has regularly decided these cases using a standard that in one way 
or another amounts to: "So long as we are persuaded that the defendant 
was guilty, we will not worry about the error, or the representation, or 
the process avoided." Whatever may be attractive or unattractive about 
these iesults as a matter of constitutional jurisprudence, all require the 
Court to develop a certainty about whether the defendant was real& 
guilty. 
The harmless error test from Chapman v. California l7 reads as if it 
were consistent with the Brennan-Harlan view of truth-a determination 
of "what happened" that, when wrong, is wrong in the defendant's favor. 
The Chapman rule holds that an error can be considered harmless only if 
the government can persuade the Court beyond a reasonable doubt that 
the error "did not contribute to the verdict."18 The Court, however, has 
not administered the rule as if the Court were making a judgment about 
whether the error influenced the jury verdict. It has, rather, adminis- 
tered the rule as if the Court were determining whether the defendant 
was guilty. As a result, the Court was able to say beyond a reasonable 
doubt in one Florida case, Milton v. Wainwright,lg that a defendant's 
confession did not influence a jury," and in another, Schneble v. Flor- 
ida,21 that the defendant's confession was so influential that a codefend- 
ant's implication of the defendant did not influence the jury." Leaving 
17. 386 U.S. 18 (1967). 
18. Id. at 24. 
19. 407 U.S. 371 (1972). 
20. Id. at 377. 
21. 405 U.S. 427 (1972). 
22. Id. at 43 1 .  
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aside the obvious question-if the evidence was so clearly inadmissible 
and unimportant, why did anyone offer it or admit it in the first place?- 
it is difficult to imagine how a lawyer who has ever seen a trial could 
believe beyond a reasonable doubt that a jury would not be influenced by 
a defendant's confession or by a codefendant's accusing finger. In 
Milton, five of the lawyers on the bench were persuaded that the defen- 
dant's confession did not influence the jury; four were not.23 Yet earlier 
that term, in Schneble, six of the lawyers on the bench-five of whom 
would say beyond a reasonable doubt, in Milton, that a confession would 
not influence a jury-decided that the defendant's confession had so 
much influence on the jury that the codefendant's confession implicating 
the defendant did not influence the jury-beyond a reasonable doubt.24 
The reasonable explanation for the two results is that the defendants 
were guilty-which they were, and that the Court knew it-which it did. 
The Court's "truth" was truth of what real& happened. It was not the 
criminal justice "truth" that finds facts in a manner calculated to ensure 
liberty for the innocent. 
It is fair to ask: So what if the Court has focused on "the real truth," 
rather than a "truth" determined with a thumb on the scale? "The basic 
purpose of a trial," Justice Stewart reminds us, "is the determination of 
Despite critiques offered by centuries of commentators-from 
Bentham to Brennan-complaining that the adversary system is a 
"sporting event" instead of a "quest for truth,"26 we maintain a general 
belief that Justice Stewart's observation is correct and that the system 
works. Professor Babcock exprzsses that belief and offers an illuminating 
resolution of the apparent conflict between truth and sport in her 
thoughtful analysis of discovery and counsel in the criminal justice sys- 
tem: "[Tlhe concepts of fair play in sport and due process in criminal 
trials are in fact united. We have taken the notion of fair play from its 
native habitat in the world of games and sports and applied it directly to 
23. 407 U.S. at 378. 
24. 405 U.S. at 431. 
25. Tehan v. United States ex rel Shott, 382 U.S. 406, 416 (1966). 
26. J. FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL: MYTH AND REALITY IN AMERICAN JUSTICE (1949), and 
Frankel, The Search for Truth: An Urnpireal View, 123 U .  PA. L. REV 1031 (1975) are two of the 
best known "friendly" critiques of the adversary system. Though Frank did not find the adversary 
system so wanting that it ought to be replaced, his chapter, "The 'Fight' Theory v. The 'Truth' 
Theory," has influenced a generation of critics who believe the adversary process and truth finding to 
be incompatible. 
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our legal pr~cedures."~' 
Ironically, the adversary system resolution of truth and sport, through 
application of the "notion of fair play . . . directly to our legal proce- 
dures," threatens the Brennan-Harlan view of the criminal justice sys- 
tem. Concentration in the current Court on the twin notions that the 
adversary system aims for the truth and fair play leads to the truth have 
combined to define the criminal justice system as a search for the real 
and certain truth, rather than a search for the truth of which we can be 
really certain. The result has been less process due to criminal defend- 
ants-particularly guilty ones. 
Nowhere has the Court's search for "real truth" had a greater impact 
than in criminal discovery. The Court has used Justice Brennan's "quest 
for truth" to stand his result on its head, simultaneously diminishing de- 
fense discovery and the defendant's fifth amendment-due process shield 
against being the agent of his own conviction. 
Two months after Justice Brennan's first Tyrrell Williams Lecture, the 
Supreme Court decided its first major criminal discovery case. The 
Court's opinion by Justice Douglas in Brady v. Maryland,28 rejected the 
"sporting event" approach to criminal trials and suggested that failure of 
discovery raised grave doubt about the truth of the trial result. It tied the 
need for truth to the process due to a criminal defendant: 
[sluppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon 
request violates due process . . . . 
The principle . . . is . . . avoidance of an unfair trial to the accused. 
Society wins not only when the guilty are convicted but when criminal tri- 
als are fair . . . .29 
Brady was both the beginning and the zenith of the Court's attempt to 
provide the defendant discovery of the prosecution's case "to enhance the 
truth-finding process so as to minimize the danger that an innocent de- 
fendant will be con~icted."~~ 
Agurs v. United States,31 decided only six years after Brady, began the 
erosion of the defense discovery Justice Brennan and others believed was 
aimed at ensuring that innocent defendants avoid conviction. Linda 
27. Babcock, Fair Play: Evidence Favorable to an Accused and Effective Assistance of Counsel, 
34 STAN. L REV. 1133, 1135 (1982). 
28. 373 U.S. 83 (1963). The opinion was announced by Justice Brennan. 
29. Id. at 87. 
30. Brennan, The Criminal Prosecution: Sporting Event or Quest for the Truth? A Progress 
Report, 68 WASH. U.L.Q. 1 (1990). 
31. 427 U.S. 97 (1976). 
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Agurs was being tried for the murder of a man who, only after her 
screams brought help, was discovered on top of her, wounded but trying 
to turn his own knife blade into her body. Agurs' lawyer asked the pros- 
ecution for any Brady material. The prosecutor did not disclose the file 
information that the deceased had two felony convictions, one for assault 
and one for carrying a deadly weapon-a knife.32 After her conviction, 
Agurs contended that the prosecutor's failure to turn over the informa- 
tion about the victim's convictions for violent crimes-convictions that 
would have been admissible and relevant to her claim of self-defense, 
whether or not she knew of the convictions4enied her a fair trial under 
 brad^.^^ 
The court of appeals reversed Agurs' conviction, holding "that the 
prosecutor has a constitutional obligation to disclose any information 
that might affect the jury's verdict."34 In a fit of incredible irony, the 
Supreme Court decided that the appellate court's statement "approaches 
the 'sporting theory of justice' which the Court expressly rejected in 
 brad^,"^^ because "[ilf everything that might influence a jury must be 
disclosed, the only way a prosecutor could discharge his constitutional 
duty would be to allow complete discovery of his files as a matter of 
routine practice."36 The "might influence a jury" standard disparaged 
by the Court was created by Justice Stevens, not by the appellate court 
being reversed. The appellate court decided the case under a strict Brady 
formulation, quoting directly from the Brady holding. It did not require 
disclosure of "everything that might influence a jury," rather only infor- 
mation that might "affect the jury's verdict. "37 
The reader is left to speculate why complete discovery of the prosecu- 
tor's information would approach "the sporting theory of justicem-a 
phrase the Court must have known would be read as just the opposite of 
a quest for the truth. There was not even a hint of the State v. Tune38 
litany about discovery creating unreasonable advantages for defendants 
to which Justice Brennan responded in his first Tyrrell Williams lec- 
t ~ r e . ~ ~  The Court's extended discussion of "materiality"40 suggests that 
32. Id. at 101. 
33. Id. at 100 & n.3. 
34. Id. at 108. 
35. Id. 
36. Id. at 109. 
37. Id. (emphasis added). 
38. 13 N.J. 203, 98 A.2d 881 (1953). 
39. 1963 WASH. U.L.Q. 279, 288-93. 
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the Court might have been concerned about forcing the prosecutor to 
decide at the government's peril what would influence a jury. In a subse- 
quent discovery case, United States v. BagleyY4' Justice Stevens implies 
that Agurs turned on the defendant's general request for information and 
the resulting lack of notice to a prosecutor that the defendant did not 
have the specific evidence in question or that the defendant had any need 
for it. That seems, however, an unlikely foundation for reducing the im- 
port of Brady. If the prosecutor's choice whether to disclose a piece of 
information, not the information itself, is the problem, the prosecutor 
can avoid the dilemma by giving the information. If the Court was con- 
cerned about difficult prosecutorial decisions with respect to the useful- 
ness to the defense of particular information, Agurs was the wrong case 
in which to do the worrying. No prosecutor would have to guess in a 
self-defense case whether the defense would like to know if the victim 
had convictions suggesting a propensity for violence. 
Professor Babcock speculates that the Court really was making, rather 
than avoiding, a sporting event based decision that the prosecution ought 
not have to give the defense something that the defense has not earned.42 
Her suggestion is not particularly flattering if understood as suggesting 
the Court was hypocritical in placing the sporting event label on the pro- 
ponents of full discovery. It may be the more reasonable of the various 
explanations for the Agurs result, however, and not nearly so unflattering 
as might first appear. 
The Court distinguished Agurs' general request for information from 
Brady and imposed a lesser prosecutorial obligation to disclose informa- 
tion when the defendant or the lawyer does not know enough to make a 
specific request. Unfortunately, if a "quest for truth" in the Brennan- 
Harlan criminal justice formulation is the issue, the difference demands 
the opposite result. The innocent defendant, who does not know enough 
to ask the right question, or the defendant represented by a real estate 
lawyer, who does not know a crime from a is the one most 
40. Agurs, 427 U.S. at 108-14. 
41. 473 U.S. 667 (1985). 
42. Babcock sees the Court's message in Agurs thus: "Stop reversing criminal convictions in 
~ e s  where the prosecution team has merely failed to give unearned aid to the defense team. Re- 
verse only when the prosecutor has played the game unfairly." Babcock, supra note 27, at 1152. 
43. Professor Babcock's explication and justification of the contest theory of truth finding lead 
her to conclude that decisions like Agurs, based upon fair play in the sporting sense, could only be 
justified if the Court would maintain a high standard for the assistance of counsel necessary under 
the sixth amendment. See Babcock, supra note 27, at 1171-74. 
Heinonline - -  68 Wash. U. L. Q. 58 1990 
DISCOVERY: QUEST FOR TRUTH 
likely to be convicted wrongly by the Court's discovery rules. The gen- 
eral nature of the request, which factually distinguishes Agurs from 
Brady, has nothing to do with the substantive value of the information to 
the defendant, except to suggest that the less knowledgable defendant 
might need it more. 
One proposition is clear, regardless of the explanation for the Agurs 
result: "Quest for truth," in order to avoid convicting an innocent de- 
fendant, was of no immediate concern to the Court. Although the Court 
had no apparent interest in the Brennan-Harlan formulation of "truth," 
it had something in mind when it decried a procedure that struck it as 
approaching the "sporting theory of justice." If one accepts Professor 
Babcock's persuasive analysis that the Agurs Court was vindicating ad- 
versary-system principles of the disciplined contest, the result for crimi- 
nal discovery is replacement of the Brennan-Harlan criminal justice 
defined "truth" with a "what really happened truth"-the truth by 
which we justify the adversary system in general. 
The Court has discovered the wrong truth while it has increased dis- 
covery. The difference between the truth that justifies the adversary sys- 
tem and the truth for which the criminal justice system is designed is well 
illuminated by the Supreme Court decisions inventing and refining prose- 
cution discovery in criminal cases. 
The Court first approved prosecution discovery in Williams v. Flor- 
ida.44 It could find nothing in the privilege against self-incrimination, or 
in the due process requirement that the government bear the entire bur- 
den of proving criminal activity, that would invalidate florida's statute 
compelling the defendant to give notice of alibi and witness information 
to the prosecution. Justice White rebuffed the defendant's due process 
argument against government discovery by using the game/truth ' 
dichotomy: 
[A] trial . . . is not yet a poker game . . . . We find ample room in that 
system, at least as far as "due process" is concerned, for the instant Florida 
rule, which is designed to enhance the search for truth in the criminal trial 
by insuring both the defendant and the State ample opportunity to investi- 
gate . . . . 45 
The adversary system truth, in the Court's view, was sufficiently impor- 
tant that it eclipsed any criminal justice system procedures that were not 
even handed-even if the procedures were born in the Constitution. The 
44. 399 U.S. 78 (1970). 
45. Id. at 82. 
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Court's approval of procedures for finding the "what really happened 
truth" was, in the dissenting Justice Black's view, a "radical and danger- 
ous departure." His may be the last eloquent description of a fast fading 
American criminal justice system designed to find a particular kind of 
truth: 
It  is no answer to this argument to suggest . . . "poker game" or "sport- 
ing contest," for that tactical advantage to the defendant is inherent in the 
type of trial required by our Bill of Rights. The Framers were well aware of 
the awesome investigative and prosecutorial powers of government and it 
was in order to limit those powers that they spelled out in detail in the 
Constitution the procedure to be followed in criminal trials. . . . All of 
these rights are designed to shield the defendant against state power. . . . 
Throughout the process the defendant has -a fundamental right to remain 
silent, in effect challenging the State at every point to: "Prove it!" 
. . . .  
A criminal trial is in part a search for truth. But it is also a system 
designed to protect "freedom" by insuring that no one is criminally pun- 
ished unless the State has first succeeded in the admittedly difficult task of 
convincing a jury that the defendant is guilty. That task is made more diffi- 
cult by the Bill of Rights . . . . The Framers decided that the benefits . . . 
were well worth any loss in "efficiency" that resulted. Their decision con- 
stitutes the final word on the subject . . . .46 
The final word, of course, did not belong to the Framers, but to the 
Court. Justice Black's further, unhappy observation, that the Court's 
"test of constitutionality is the test of 'fairness,' "47 has proved prophetic. 
In Wardius v. the Court relied on due process to strike down a 
notice-of-alibi statute that would have provided the Oregon prosecutor 
with the same information that the Court allowed the Florida prosecutor 
to obtain. The Oregon statute's failure to provide "reciprocal discovery 
rights" caused the different result. 
The prosecutorial discovery cases demonstrate the Court's conversion 
of due process in criminal cases from a series of rights and procedures 
designed to aid a quest for a truth with a bias, into a quest for the truth of 
"what realIy happened9'-a truth the Court is convinced results from a 
classic adversary process of evenhanded confrontation between lawyers. 
The consequences for the administration of criminal justice are signifi- 
cant beyond the irony of the discovery cases, in which the quest for truth 
46. Id. at 11 1-14 @lack, J., dissenting). 
47. Id. at 115. 
48. 412 U.S. 470 (1973). 
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diminished the ability of a defendant, who could not otherwise obtain the 
information, to discover facts and increased the ability of the govern- 
ment, which has almost unlimited investigatory power, to discover de- 
fense strategy. Now, when lawyers, legislators, and judges think about 
fairness in the criminal justice system, they think of evenhanded treat- 
ment. This thought process leads down a very slippery slope-from the 
equal chance to obtain information from the opponent, to an equal 
chance to insist on having the defendant examined, to an equal chance to 
call witnesses, to an equal chance to comment on the failure to call wit- 
nesses, to an equal chance to explain what happened to the jury, to an 
equal chance to insist that the other side explain what happened, and on 
and on. 
The foregoing reasonably could be dismissed as senseless paranoia 
were it not for the strength with which the signal has gone out that the 
hallmark of the criminal process is fairness as defined by procedural 
evenhandedness. It is a particularly dangerous signal because it incorpo- 
rates an adversarial idea to which we all aspire in civil litigation. Con- 
sider the trial judge whose ruling prohibiting Donald Perry from 
speaking to his lawyer during a trial recess was upheld in Pery v. 
Leeke.49 Because the ruling was upheld, some risk exists that the judge 
and others will believe that both his ruling and his reason were appropri- 
ate. The trial judge explained that he was overruling a defense objection 
because "he felt compelled to act as he did to ensure . . . 'fairness to the 
state.' "50 He believed it was his task to see that the trial "remain[ed] fair 
to all parties."51 Dissenting from the Court's approval of the trial judge's 
action, Justice Marshall, joined by Justice Brennan observed: "Needless 
to say, the due process concerns . . . are designed to ensure a fair trial for 
the defendant, not the State."52 It was not "needless to say"; it was too 
late, or too many votes ago, to say. 
What was discovered in the quest for truth was an unreasonable pas- 
sion for procedural evenhandedness, exemplified by criminal discovery. 
The Supreme Court apparently has forgotten the environment that 
caused the Framers to fear arbitrary government, to try limiting the ex- 
traordinary power of the government to investigate and accumulate evi- 
dence, to try to reverse the real presumption of guilt with which every 
49. 109 S.Ct. 594 (1989). 
50. Id. at 609 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
51. Id. at 609 n.9. 
52. Id. at 609 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
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defendant enters a courtroom, and to adjust, procedurally and in a deci- 
sionmaking way, the terrible imbalance between the government and the 
defendant-usually an individual with no power, no education, no 
means, and no understanding. 
Unlike the Framers of our Constitution, the Court has not been ex- 
posed to enough of the too-often hidden exercises of arbitrary govern- 
ment power of the kind recently chronicled in The Thin Blue Line.53 
The Court has been too long gone from the everyday oppression of a 
criminal justice system that grinds harshly on the guilty and the innocent 
in equal measure. It  has lost any sense of the need for a criminal justice 
truth-telling system designed as a check against both accidental and ma- 
licious miscarriages of justice that deny liberty. But then, haven't we all? 
- - -- - - 
53. For a frightening reminder of prosecutorial authority run amok, see Gershman, The Thin 
Blue Line: Art or Trial in the Fact-Finding Process?, 9 PACE L. REV. 275 (1989). 
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